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Abstract: This study examines the efficacy and moderators of New York State interventions for 
schools in need of improvement under NCLB, including: (1) school transfer, (2) supplementary 
education service (3) corrective action, (4) planning for restructuring, and (5) restructuring. 
Despite the fact that schools in increasingly aggressive treatment groups had higher performance 
gains relative to schools in good standing, propensity score matching analysis results reveal 
negative or null effects of the interventions. There are indications of treatment effect 
heterogeneity and the effects varied by the year of implementation and the propensity of 
treatment assignment (schooling conditions prior to interventions). The findings of our study 
have implications for both theory of action and program implementation. 
Keywords: accountability, achievement, intervention. 
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Resumen: Este estudio examina la eficacia y los desafíos de las intervenciones estatales en 
Nueva York para escuelas que necesitan mejoramiento bajo el mandato de la ley NCLB, 
incluyendo: (1) la transferencia de la escuela, (2) servicios educativos suplementarios (SES) (3) 
acciones correctivas, (4) planificación de reestructuración y (5) reestructuración. Mientras que las 
escuelas en los grupos de tratamiento más agresivos tuvieron mayores ganancias de rendimiento 
en relación con las escuelas en buen estado, resultados de análisis de propensión revelan efectos 
negativos o nulos de las intervenciones. Hay indicios de heterogeneidad del efecto del 
tratamiento y los efectos varían según el año de puesta en práctica y la propensión de la 
asignación al tratamiento (condiciones de escolarización antes de intervenciones). Los resultados 
de nuestro estudio tienen consecuencias tanto para la teoría de la acción como de la 
implementación del programa. 
Palabras-clave: rendición de cuentas; logros académicos; intervención. 
 
Avaliar o impacto das intervenções escolares baseadas nos mandatos do NCLB  no estado 
de New York: Será que servem as mesmas soluções para todos? 
Resumo: O presente estudo analisa a eficácia e os desafios das intervenções do estado de Nova 
York em escolas que precisam ser melhoradas sob o mandato NCLB, incluindo: (1) a transferência 
da escola, (2) serviços educacionais suplementares (SES) (3) ações corretivas, (4) plano de 
reestruturação, e (5) reestruturação. Enquanto as escolas em grupos de tratamento mais agressivos 
tiveram ganhos de desempenho superiores em relação às escolas em bom estado, os resultados da 
análise de propensão revelam efeitos negativos ou nulos dessas intervenções. Há evidências de 
heterogeneidade do efeito do tratamento e os efeitos variam de acordo com o ano de aplicação e a 
propensão de atribuição do tratamento (antes das intervenções e condições de  escolaridade). Os 
resultados do nosso estudo têm implicações para a teoria da ação e da implementação do programa. 
Palavras-chave: responsabilidade, realização, de intervenção. 
Research Problems 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) in the United States is aimed at ensuring 
100 percent reading and math proficiency for all students across all states by 2014 (Pub.L. 107-110, 
enacted January 8, 2002). While NCLB allows individual states to set Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP) targets based on states’ own performance standards and assessments, states have to monitor 
and report the percentage of schools that did not make AYP as well as the percentage of schools 
identified as being in need of improvement. Initially, it was estimated that up to 80 percent of 
schools in some states could be identified as either needing improvement or corrective action in the 
first few years under NCLB (Marion et al., 2002; Olson, 2002). According to several national and 
state reports of actual AYP statistics in the past six years of NCLB implementation however, it turns 
out that the percentage of schools identified as being in need of improvement was much smaller 
than expected, despite variations among the 50 states and some signs of increasing rates (Council of 
Chief State School Officers [CCSSO], 2008; Padilla et al., 2006; LeFloch et al., 2007; Education 
Week, 2004, 2006).  
Across states, the percentage of schools that did not meet performance targets and 
consequently received interventions depended not only on how well the schools performed but also 
on how rigorous the performance standards and targets were, relative to national standards (Lee, 
2010). All between-state comparisons of assessment and accountability results are complicated by 
the fact that school accountability targets (Annual Measurable Objective, or AMO) and performance 
standards vary substantially among states. Recent policy changes by the U.S. Department of 
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Education have enabled states to abandon the unrealistic goal of meeting 100 percent proficiency 
targets by 2014 by allowing states to apply for the waiver of AYP requirements in exchange for 
adopting more rigorous performance standards for college/career readiness and linking teacher 
evaluation to student performance outcomes. Although this policy change has the potential to make 
the original NCLB school accountability rules obsolete, it is still important for educational 
policymakers and practitioners to reflect on past practices and results.  
While the primary source of NCLB implementation was the law itself, another layer of 
interpretation has been added by the U.S. Department of Education who developed and negotiated 
regulations and operating guidelines for states to comply with NCLB (Mills, 2008).  Previous studies 
showed problems with states’ fidelity of NCLB implementation, particularly during the first several 
years after the law passed (Erpenbarch, Forte-Fast, & Potts, 2003; American Institutes for Research, 
2006; Kim & Sunderman, 2004). Moreover, another study showed that the fidelity of states’ 
implementation was not a significant predictor of state assessment proficiency gains or National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) proficiency gains (Lee, 2010). Regardless of states’  
compliance with federal policy, the effectiveness of school-level participation, delivery, and receipt 
of services fall under more question. A study shows very limited participation in supplemental 
education services (24-28% in elementary and <5% in high school) and school choice (<1%) 
(Zimmer et al., 2007). As last resort interventions, corrective action and restructuring also appear to 
have been either underused or ineffective (Center on Education Policy [CEP], 2008; Mathis, 2009).1 
Although NCLB provides a federal mandate for states to develop statewide systems of support 
intended to build the capacity of underperforming districts and schools, this new expectation for an 
enhanced role of state education agencies in school improvement has faced serious challenges due to 
limitations associated with the state agencies’ own fiscal, administrative, and technical capacities 
(Center on Education Policy, 2007c; McClure, 2005; Rhim, Hassel, & Redding, 2008). Moreover, the 
policy impact on student achievement depends on long-term statewide funding for school resources 
rather than short-term state agency support for data tracking and interventions (Lee & Reeves, 
2012).  
The working theory of test-driven school accountability policy postulates that such policy 
can bring about significant change in educational practice and academic improvement by holding 
schools accountable for test results with possible sanctions and interventions. However, evidence 
for the effects of pre-NCLB high-stakes testing and test-driven accountability on student 
achievement has been mixed (Lee, 2008). Similarly, recent studies on post-NCLB academic progress 
and the policy impact were mixed and inconclusive (see Dee & Jacob, 2009; Lee & Reeves, 2012; 
National Research Council, 2011; Wong, Cook, & Steiner, 2009). While these previous studies 
examined overall national policy impact across states, it is important to examine the effects of state-
specific interventions at the school level as well. Further, it is critical to understand school-level 
contextual factors that facilitate or constrain the policy impact. This study examines the efficacy and 
moderators of New York State interventions for schools in need of improvement under NCLB, that 
is, schools that failed to meet the AYP target for at least two consecutive years and went through 
sequential stages of interventions, including: (1) school transfer, (2) supplementary education service 
(SES) (3) corrective action, (4) planning for restructuring, and (5) restructuring.  
 
                                                
1 Common interventions for corrective action involved changes in curriculum or the appointment of outside 
advisors. Reopening the school as a charter school, replacing all or most of the school staff, or turning over 
school operations either to the state or a private company with a demonstrated record of effectiveness were 
rarely used options (U.S. Department of Education, 2003). 
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Review of Prior Research on School Interventions under NCLB 
Prior empirical studies that address school interventions under NCLB accountability have 
focused on either the implementation or the effects of specific intervention types (e.g., school 
transfer, supplemental educational services, or restructuring). A number of studies have examined 
the initial stages of accountability intervention, or the provision of Supplemental Educational 
Services (SES) and/or the option of school transfer.  There was some heterogeneity of study results 
regarding the effect of SES on academic achievement.  In a study on district implementation of SES 
at the early stage of NCLB, Sunderman, Kim, and Orfield (2005) found that the provision of these 
services was inconsistent for districts with large percentages of low-income and minority students.  
In another study that examined the effect of SES on student achievement, Ross et al. (2008) 
reported a small positive effect of SES on student achievement but noted that SES providers needed 
to offer direct tutoring services that targeted state standards and test content. In another study of the 
effect of SES and school choice, Zimmer et al. (2007) reported a modest, positive effect of SES on 
students’ reading and math achievement across seven school districts. The researchers, however, 
reported an insignificant effect of school transfer/choice (i.e. the first tier of intervention) on 
students’ achievement across six school districts (Zimmer et al., 2007).  Using Milwaukee Public 
School data, Heinrich, Meyer, and Whitten (2010) reported no statistically significant effect of SES 
participation on students’ math or reading achievements across the grade level.  
There is evidence that SES was not sufficiently provided to all targeted students (see Heinrich 
et al., 2010; Office of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability as study of Chicago Public Schools, 
2007; Potter et al., 2007; Rickles & White, 2006). Although federal regulations require that all states 
need to approve SES providers based on scientific review (including evidence that the programs are 
effective among students that are among targeted groups), many states are not using a specific form 
to monitor the quality of the SES providers. Furthermore, the monitoring activity at the state-level 
has focused mainly on compliance-related reporting based on occasional visits by external 
constituents or has been focused on school and district self-reports (Burch, Steinberg, & Donovan, 
2007). 
While more studies have examined interventions that occur earlier in the NCLB sequence, 
there has been at least one study that focused on more severe interventions such as restructuring. 
Based on an analysis of data from five states on schools that were restructuring in 2006-2007, Scott 
(2008) found no statistical evidence that one restructuring plan was more effective than another in 
terms of helping schools make AYP. Similar to problems associated with the implementation of 
other interventions, Scott (2008) also reported that state, district, and schools experienced difficulty 
in implementing the restructuring plan. Findings related to the prevalence of restructuring varied 
across states. While the number of schools requiring restructuring intervention has risen since 2004 
in California, Ohio, and Maryland, the number of schools in the intervention of Georgia has 
declined during the same period of time (Duffrin, Scott, & Kober, 2008). At this time, it is still 
unclear whether the reduced number of schools in restructuring in Georgia can be attributed to the 
state’s (or school’s) efforts.  
There is some evidence that state education agencies played an important role in offering 
direct guidance and technical assistance in order to help to implement district improvement plans 
(Crane et al., 2008; Hergert, Gleason, & Urbano, 2009). In a review of intervention plans for eight 
states (Maine, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, 
and Vermont), all of the eight states supported low performing schools or districts; states’ plans 
generally fall into three categories: support to launch the intervention, continuing consultant and communication, 
and topic-specific professional development (Hergert et al., 2009). Each State provided templates, tools, and 
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consultations regarding assessment and improvement plan in order to assist schools or districts. 
New York State Education Department (NYSED) has established a Regional Network Strategy as a 
regional technical assistance system in order to provide technical assistance for schools and districts 
that required improvement under state and federal accountability systems (e.g., Regional School 
Support Centers, Special Education Training and Resource Centers, Bi-Lingual Education Technical 
Assistance Centers, Student Support Services Centers, and Regional Adult Education Network) 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2006b). However, Taylor et al. (2010) found that although states 
provided technical assistance for implementing NCLB interventions for school improvement, there 
was often insufficient technical assistance, especially for improving services intended for students 
with disabilities as well as for students with limited English proficiency.  
Methods 
Data Sources 
We choose to focus on tracking the impact of school AYP interventions within a single 
state, New York State. New York State is one of the first generation accountability states that 
adopted high-stakes school accountability before NCLB. The state has also continued to 
strengthen its policy since NCLB; it was ranked very high on the measure of the fidelity of 
NCLB policy implementation (Lee, 2008). NYSED played an active role in the process by 
developing a rationale (theory of action) for interventions to assist in the implementation of 
NCLB; for schools and districts that fail to improve, the quantity and intensity of supports and 
monitoring would increase over time (Hergert et al., 2009). The state also raised student 
proficiency standards for its state assessment since NCLB. As a result, the percentage of schools 
that failed to meet AYP in New York State has fluctuated, changing from 25% in 2004, 16% in 
2005, 29% in 2006, 20% in 2007, 16% in 2008, 12% in 2009, and 38% in 2010. This volatility is 
primarily attributable to changes in the level of performance standards during 2006 and 2010 
when the failure rate increased substantially across the state.  
Data include all New York State public schools with achievement outcome measures and 
time-varying AYP status and intervention history along with school and district profiles. There 
were two main sources of data used in this study: achievement data from the New York State 
Report Cards (NYSRC)2 collected by the New York State Education Department (NYSED) and 
data from the Common Core of Data (CCD) collected by the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES). Since the NYSRC data include information on students’ achievement in 
reading/English Language Arts (ELA) and math at the school level, data from 1999 – 2009 on 
schools’ Mean Score, Proficiency Level, and Performance Index for both reading and math were 
recorded. This paper focuses on outcomes related to schools’ Performance Index Gain. A 
school’s Performance Index is a summative measure ranging from 0 – 200 that captures the 
percentage of students achieving at Level 2, 3, or 4 and the percentage of students achieving at 
Level 3 and 4. Schools’ Performance Index Gain therefore represents changes in these 
percentages across a single academic year.  
The information from NYSED on school districts in New York State was supplemented by 
data on school demographic information from the CCD. Two CCD data sets for New York State 
were used: the Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey Data3 and Local 
                                                
2 https://reportcards.nysed.gov/  
3 http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubagency.asp 
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Education Agency (School District) Finance Survey (F-33) Data.4 Certain information about 
students, such as percentage English Language Learner, percentage Students enrolled in Special 
Education, and Instructional Expenditure per Pupil was available only at the district-level; thus, this 
information in the data set is representative of the schools’ respective district. The analytical sample 
was restricted to regular public schools5 in New York State. Since certain schools changed school 
types between 1999 and 2009, only schools which were consistently categorized as regular for the 11 
consecutive years were retained in the analytical sample.  
After data from multiple sources were combined, school accountability status was coded for 
each year. School accountability status was reported on the annual school report card (SRC), 
available through the NYSED. Among all school districts in New York State, school districts in 
New York City only provided the SRC information from 2004-2005 to 2009-2010 academic years. 
Further, due to significant changes in state accountability policy and performance standards in 2009-
2010, the results were not directly comparable to previous years so that the data for 2009-2010 
academic year were excluded from this study. As a result, this study used data on school 
accountability status for (regular) schools in New York State in the academic years 2004-2005 
through 2008-2009.  
An artifact of the current state accountability system was that there were increasingly smaller 
numbers of schools in the upper category of the accountability intervention sequence; designation 
into the higher order of accountability groups with stronger intervention required school failure over 
several years so these data were more difficult to capture. In order to increase reliability of the 
analysis and facilitate comparison across years, the sets of annual school data for 2005 through 2009 
were pooled to create a single merged data set. For example, information for School A in the year 
2006 had prior year information from 2004-05 and present year information from 2005-06. All of 
the variables in the data set were transformed and were combined to produce repeated measures for 
each school. The final N in the 4th grade sample was 6,381records from 1,605 schools for ELA 
assessment and 6,418 records from 1,620 schools for math assessment; the final N in the 8th grade 
sample was 2,564 records from 663 schools for ELA assessment and 2,572 records from 664 
schools for math assessment.  
Variables 
The dependent variable in this study was schools’ Performance Index (PI) Gain for fourth and 
eighth graders’ reading and math assessments. A school’s PI determines the schools’ Adequate 
Yearly Performance and is defined by the state education department as follows: 
(1) PIt = (  + )y 
where PLi = Percentage of Proficiency Level i under NY accountability where i =1 to 4
6; t = 
years from 2004 to 2009.  
Therefore, the PI Gain for year t is defined as the gap between the PI for the current year and 
the PI for the prior year, as demonstrated in Equation (2): 
(2)  PI Gaint = PIt – PIt-1.                    
                                                
4 http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/f33agency.asp 
5 Excludes ‘special education schools’, ‘vocational schools’, and ‘other/alternative schools.’ 
6 Student scores on the tests are converted to four performance levels, from Level 1 to Level 4. Each level 
represents student performance relative to learning standards: Level 1 = Not Meeting Learning Standards, 
Level 2 = Partially Meeting Learning Standards, Level 3 = Meeting Learning Standards, Level 4 = Meeting 
Learning Standards with Distinction. This PI formula gives full credit for performance at Level 3 and Level 4 
and gives partial credit for Level 2.  
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The main independent variable in this study was accountability status. School Accountability 
status was coded in two different ways in order to estimate (a) an overall effect, as well as (b) the 
differential effects of accountability treatment on school achievement outcomes. In order to 
estimate an overall effect, schools in good standing were coded as 0 while schools in intervention 
(i.e. schools in need of improvement, in corrective action, planning for restructuring, and 
restructuring) were all coded as 1. In order to estimate differential effects of treatment on 
achievement relative to the achievement of schools in good standing, schools receiving interventions 
were coded as follows: schools in intervention Year One = 1; schools in intervention Year Two = 2; 
in corrective action = 3; planning for restructuring = 4; and, restructuring  = 5. Due to a small 
number of cases, the interventions for schools at any stage of restructuring (e.g. restructuring year 
one, restructuring year two, etc.) were captured in the restructuring variable (i.e. at level 5). 
The other variables used in the analysis were considered covariates. The following time-varying 
covariates were included: %Free lunch, %White students, %Black students, %Hispanic students, %Asian 
students, School size, Pupil-teacher ratio, PI (prior year only), PI Gain (prior year only) and accountability 
status (prior year only). Time-invariant covariates included type of the school as Magnet (compared to 
non-Magnet) and location of the school as Urban or Rural (compared to Suburban). District-level 
information on %ELL, %IEP, and Expenditure per pupil was only included for prior year in the 
analysis. These covariates include observable confounding factors that are associated with both 
treatment assignment and proficiency gain. More detailed description of the variables is provided in 
Appendix A.   
Analytical Methods 
The data analysis consists of two parts. First, the study compares schools in good standing 
(comparison group) with schools in need of improvement (treatment group) in terms of their 
underlying student/school characteristics (covariates) and PI gains. Further, the study differentiates 
treatment group schools at five different stages of intervention and compares each of five different 
treatment subgroups with the comparison group. Failure to observe more gains for treatment group 
after controlling for the covariates would indicate that the mandated interventions were ineffective. 
This logic is based on the NCLB theory of action that lagging schools with mandated interventions 
under threats of sanctions will make larger gains to reach proficiency.  
Since schools’ accountability status (treatment condition) changes over time and school 
characteristics that influence assignment to treatment conditions and outcomes also change as well, 
time-varying causal effect model estimation procedures are needed to examine the effects of school-
level AYP interventions under NCLB. We employ propensity score matching with Inverse 
Probability Treatment Weighting (IPTW) and difference-in-differences methods to account for 
selection bias7. IPTW realizes this matching by assigning differential weights to subjects based on the 
                                                
7 Selection bias can be addressed through IPTW that weights subjects by the inverse probability of receiving a 
treatment at a given time conditional on prior treatment and outcome history as well as time-varying and 
time-invariant covariates (Hong & Raudenbush, 2008). The following formula was used for computing 
stabilized weight (w) for each school i: 
 wi =  
For schools in need of improvement (T =1), the greater chance of treatment group assignment conditional on 
the covariates (p(T=1|X)), the smaller the weight it gets. For schools in good standing (T =0), the greater the 
chance of control group assignment given covariates (p(T=0|X)), the smaller the weight. The same logic 
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inverse probability of receiving a treatment at a given time, conditional on prior outcome history and 
other covariates (Hirano & Imbens, 2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984). Difference-in-differences 
method utilizes matched comparison of the two groups in their PI gain scores (differences between 
pretest and posttest scores). 
Based on school identification rules and prior research, we identified covariates that were 
likely to be associated with both accountability status and achievement outcomes (see Appendix A). 
Then, the treatment variable (z) – either a dummy variable (for the binary analysis of schools in need 
of improvement) or a categorical variable (for the multinomial analysis of schools at different stages 
of intervention) for accountability status – was modeled as a function of the covariates (x) using 
binomial or multinomial logistic regression (respectively) to generate propensity scores for treatment 
group assignment. With the estimated propensity score (i.e. the predicted probability that each 
school was to receive accountability intervention under NCLB, conditional on all of the covariates8), 
schools were assigned weights in order to adjust for selection bias. Finally, we fit a regression model 
with IPTW weights at the school level to estimate NCLB accountability intervention effects (see the 
final model below). We included the propensity score in the final model in addition to weighting in 
order to reduce any remaining bias due to observed covariates, increase efficiency, and examine its 
interaction with treatment.  
 
(Yit -  Yit-1) = β0  + β1 (Intervention)it + β2 (Propensity)it + β3 (Year)t + β4 (Intervention × 
Propensity)
it + β5 (Intervention × Year)it + eit 
 
Second, this study conducts an exploratory analysis of factors that could produce the 
heterogeneity of the treatment effect. At this stage of the analysis, we examine the question: What 
are the district-level or school-level characteristics and conditions that may account for different 
treatment outcomes under NCLB high-stakes accountability? This portion of the analysis 
differentiates and compares three matched groups of schools in the treatment group that went 
through an intervention in prior year but ended up with different accountability status a year later as 
a result of meeting or failing AYP targets: (1) the exit group, (2) the watch group, or (3) the fail 
group. The exit group includes schools that were identified as in need of improvement and had an 
intervention in the prior year, and exited the (intervention) status a year later by meeting AYP for 
two years in a row. The watch group includes schools that were identified as in need of 
improvement and had an intervention in prior year but remained in the same status a year later by 
not meeting AYP for two years in a row. The fail group includes schools that were identified as in 
need of improvement and had an intervention in prior year yet underwent progressive intervention 
in the subsequent year by failing to meet AYP.  The Grade 4 ELA groups included 74 cases in the 
Exit group, 338 cases in the Watch group, and 232 cases in the Fail group; the Grade 4 math groups 
included 96 cases in the Exit group, 67 cases in the Watch group, and 42 cases in the Fail group. The 
Grade 8 ELA groups included 71 cases in the Exit group, 415 cases in the Watch group and 299 
                                                                                                                                                       
applies for the analysis of multiple treatment groups with differentiated interventions.  Cases with extremely 
small or large weights (outside the value range of .10 to 10) have been excluded from analysis. 
8 The inclusion of current year covariates in propensity score matching may be questionable due to potential 
problems with post-treatment covariates. It is possible that change in school accountability status (treatment 
condition) may influence student demographic composition, pupil-teacher ratio and school size (through 
students’ school transfer or changes in school staffing). However, such changes in school demographics and 
contexts were not only rare, but also they were not supposed to be part of the intended mechanism of high-
stakes school accountability interventions (targeting changes in school practices and incentives). It turns out 
that the estimates of intervention effects with and without current year covariates are very similar. 
Evaluating the impact of NCLB school interventions in New York state 
 
9 
cases in the Fail group; the Grade 8 math groups included 128 cases in the Exit group, 200 cases in 
the Watch group and 190 cases in the Fail group.  
We conducted paired comparisons to explore the context of factors that might influence 
variations in the fidelity of implementation and the effectiveness of interventions. To enrich our 
understanding of policy implementation problems under specific school contexts, we selected two 
Title I schools (under restructuring stage) in a large urban school district for a supplementary case 
study, and conducted a content analysis of the Title I monitoring report documents as complied by 
NYSED. The monitoring reports give information on policy compliance and implementation in 
low-performing districts and schools in New York State. Through this document analysis along with 
the phone interview with the NYSED Title I office, we were able to gain a little more insight into 
how accountability works.  Our study has several limitations, including test measures and statistical 
methods. The use of state assessment as a single measure of student achievement outcome may 
bring bias to results. As with many other states, the discrepancy between NAEP and state 
assessment results in New York State raises a concern about the transferability of test score gains 
from high-stakes tests. It is critical to track long-term results with multiple measures of outcomes 
and check if the interventions had lasting effects on school performance through real long-term 
changes as opposed to temporary test score gains through malpractices (e.g., narrowing curriculum 
and teaching to the test) irrespective of interventions. Our analytic method, propensity score 
matching, has inherent limitations in that only observable differences between schools are 
controlled. Finally, the lack of information on school-level fidelity of implementation does not allow 
us to examine “treatment on treated” (TOT) effects as opposed to “intent to treat” (ITT) effects.  
Results 
Matching 
In order to identify initial group mean differences between schools in accountability treatment 
(i.e. treatment group) and schools in good standing (i.e. control group) in regard to covariates, the 
two groups were compared on all standardized covariates using t-tests for independent samples (see 
Tables 1 and 2). These results demonstrated that the differences between groups were both 
statistically and practically significant on a majority of the covariates. The two groups of schools 
were very different in terms of potentially confounding variables, across subjects and grade levels. 
Prior to matching, schools in accountability treatment had significantly (a) higher percentage of 
students eligible for free and reduced price lunch years, (b) higher percentage of Black students or 
Hispanic students, (d) higher percentage of students who had IEPs (i.e. special education students), 
(e) higher percentage of students who are English Language Learners, (f) higher number of enrolled 
students, and (g) higher pupil-teacher ratio. Similarly, the treatment group had significantly  (a) lower 
percentages of White students and Asian students, and (b) lower Performance Index in the prior 
year. Schools in accountability treatment were also more likely to be in an urban setting and be a 
magnet school, and were less likely to be in a rural setting. The only advantage demonstrated by 
schools in accountability prior to matching was with regard to expenditure per pupil at the district 
level, and this is likely attributed to extra federal and state funding to such high-needs school 
districts. 
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Table 1 
Results of Covariate Balance Checks: Standardized Mean Differences before and after Matching between Treatment 
Group (Schools in need of improvement) and Control Group (Schools in good standing) in Grade 4 ELA and Math 
 ELA Math 
  
Before 
Matching 
 
After  
Matching 
 
Before 
Matching 
 
After  
Matching 
Covariates Prior Year     
Accountability  2.536*** .018 4.605*** -.485***  
% Free lunch 1.19*** .031 .686*** .131  
% White students -1.19*** -.062 -1.076*** -.525**  
% Black students .692*** .061 .878*** .084 
% Hispanic students 1.286*** .037 .935*** .751*** 
% Asian students -.119** .021 -.223*** .098 
School size .976*** .086 .951*** -.213  
Pupil teacher ratio -.16*** -.029 -.276*** -.419* 
Magnet school .249*** -.067 .216* -.232 
Urban 1.06*** .075 1.221*** .390**  
Rural -.584*** -.126* -.641*** -.416*  
% ELL 1.196*** .059 ..384 .420* 
% IEP -.698*** .077 .8124** -.143  
Expenditure per pupil .552*** -.004 .236** .345* 
PI -1.491*** -.049 -1.782*** -.199 
PIGain -.004 -.04 .206 1.009***  
Covariates Present Year     
% Free lunch 1.274*** .048 1.296*** .504*** 
% White students -1.189*** -.057 -1.064*** -.550**  
% Black students .688*** .058 .864*** .102  
% Hispanic students 1.286*** .027 .925*** .734*** 
% Asian students -.124** .034 -.207*** .137 
School size .89*** .083 .819*** -.178 
Pupil teacher ratio -.199*** .197** -.151*** .251 
Note. All values are standardized. For after matching results, IPTW regression coefficients are 
reported. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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Table 2 
Results of Covariate Balance Checks: Standardized Mean Differences before and after Matching between Treatment 
Group (Schools in need of improvement) and Control Group (Schools in good standing) in Grade 8 ELA and Math 
 ELA Math 
  
Before 
Matching 
 
After  
Matching 
 
Before 
Matching 
 
After  
Matching 
Covariates Prior Year     
Accountability  1.912*** -.142*** 2.201*** -.145** 
% Free lunch 1.235*** -.096 .899*** .260** 
% White students -1.4*** -.123* -1.428*** -.310*** 
% Black students 1.037*** .018 1.165*** .216** 
% Hispanic students 1.148*** .173** 1.163*** .260** 
% Asian students .414*** .098 .161*** .091 
School size .75*** .115 .714*** .096 
Pupil teacher ratio .336*** .01 .363*** .027 
Magnet school .431*** .123 .242** .032 
Urban 1.333*** .085 1.306*** .309*** 
Rural -.885*** -.059 -.900*** -.166* 
% ELL 1.171*** .142* 1.097*** .203* 
% IEP .48*** .161* .398*** .119 
Expenditure per pupil .494*** -.135* .341*** .244** 
PI -1.39*** -.117** -1.578*** -.215*** 
PIGain -.06 -.297*** -.048* .029 
Covariates Present Year     
% Free lunch 1.556*** .039 1.315*** .319*** 
% White students -1.402*** -.123* -1.425*** -.333*** 
% Black students 1.031*** .008 1.151*** .219** 
% Hispanic students 1.149*** .175** 1.17*** .267** 
% Asian students .422*** .088 .169*** .087 
School size .669*** .121 .588*** .111 
Pupil teacher ratio .227*** -.014 .123** .067 
Note. All values are standardized. For after matching results, IPTW regression coefficients are 
reported. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
After schools were matched, a balance check analysis for matched groups was performed by 
examining how the treatment and control groups differed on all covariates.  The results from this 
balance check are shown in Tables 1 and 2, alongside findings from the unmatched analysis; the 
results show that the groups’ differences on covariates were generally reduced after matching. On 
average, the percentage reduction in covariate imbalance was about 87% in Grade 4 ELA and about 
63%  reduction for Grade 4 math; the average percentage reductions was about 87% for Grade 8 
ELA and only about 72% in Grade 8 math. The average reduction on the mean difference for all 
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covariates after matching was about 77%, and indicates that the full-matching efforts in the final 
analysis were overall successful, and resulted in fairly well-balanced groups9. 
Average Intervention Effects 
 Results from the unmatched group analysis are shown in Figure 1. There is a general upward 
trend, meaning that schools in increasingly aggressive treatment groups were experiencing higher 
mean PI gains relative to schools in good standing (i.e. the first category) in grade 4 ELA and Grade 
8 ELA and math. In Grade 4 ELA, the mean PI gain for schools in good standing was 1.49, while 
the mean PI gain across all schools in accountability treatment groups was 5.56; in Grade 8 ELA, the 
mean PI gain for schools in good standing was 5.29, while the mean PI gain across all schools in 
accountability treatment groups was 7.44; and in Grade 8 math, the mean PI gain for schools in 
good standing was 7.58, while the mean PI gain across all schools in accountability treatment groups 
was 10.81. Results for Grade 4 math demonstrated that schools in good standing performed better 
than schools in intervention Year One, better than schools in intervention Year Two and better than 
schools in corrective action; schools planning for restructuring and in restructuring demonstrated 
higher PI Gains relative to schools in good standing in Grade 4 math. Thus, without consideration 
of any covariates (i.e. confounding variables), it would appear as though accountability interventions 
were overall successful.  
 
Figure 1. Mean PI gain in present year by accountability status: Unmatched group analysis 
 
                                                
9 There were some exceptional covariates which showed an opposite pattern in the percentage reduction; the 
covariates include Magnet_Prior, PELL_Prior, EXP_Prior, PIGain_prior  year and pupil-teacher ratio. 
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Figure 2. Differences across accountability treatment in PI gain relative to schools in good standing: 
Matched group analysis  
 
The results from the IPTW-matched group analysis, displayed in Tables 3-4 and Figure 2, 
were very different from that of the unmatched group analysis. Generally, results from the IPTW-
matched analysis demonstrated a null or mixed effect of treatment on achievement outcomes. In 
other words, the larger PI gains observed in the treatment group mostly get smaller or disappear 
after matching such that true effects of school interventions on ELA and math achievement 
outcomes are questionable.  
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Table 3 
Results of IPTW Regression Analyses of Overall NCLB Intervention Effects on ELA and Math PI (Performance 
Index) Gain 
                ELA                 Math 
  
Grade 4 
 
Grade 8 
 
Grade 4 
 
Grade 8 
Intervention -3.238** 1.517 -10.567* 5.586* 
Year 5.055*** 4.746*** 5.447*** 8.046*** 
Intervention × Year 2.878** .157 9.252*** 5.524*** 
Propensity 1.068*** .223 .733*** 1.501*** 
Intervention × Propensity -.058 -.133 -.359 -1.850** 
R2 .16 .137 .174 .270 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
Table 4 
Summary Results of IPTW Regression Analyses of Differentiated NCLB Intervention Effects on ELA and Math 
PI (Performance Index) Gain 
 ELA Math 
  
Grade 4 
 
Grade 8 
 
Grade 4 
 
Grade 8 
Intervention 1 (Needing 
improvement year 1) 
-3.417** .562 -4.803 -.464 
Intervention 2 
(needing improvement year 
2) 
-10.042** -3.634 -.275 -1.518 
Intervention 3 
(corrective action) 
-8.934 -2.599 6.175 -.958 
Intervention 4 
(planning for restructuring) 
-.071 .162 N/A -1.285 
Intervention 5 
(restructuring) 
-9.947 -29.484*** N/A -2.629 
Year 4.872*** 4.553*** 5.276*** 7.696*** 
Propensity for Intervention 
1 
-.411* -.822 1.232*** 1.696*** 
Propensity for Intervention 
2 
1.885*** .452 .092*** 1.784 *** 
Propensity for Intervention 
3 
-.295** -1.946** -.286*** -.192 
Propensity for Intervention 
4 
-.414** .61 N/A 1.003*** 
Propensity for Intervention 
5 
-.073* 1.106*** N/A -.410*** 
R2 .18 .158 .172 .289 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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Table 3 summarizes the results of IPTW regression analysis of overall NCLB intervention 
effects on ELA and math PI gains. Regression coefficients for the overall treatment effect (i.e. the 
binary treatment analysis) demonstrated that after controlling for propensity of treatment 
assignment and year, schools in accountability treatment experienced significantly lower PI gains 
relative to schools in good standing in Grade 4 ELA (β = -3.238, p < .01) and Grade 4 math (β = -
10.567, p < .05). The effect sizes10 for these negative treatment effects in standard deviation units are 
small (d = -.14 in Grade 4 ELA) to moderate (d = -.69 in Grade 4 math). The treatment effect in 
Grade 8 ELA (β =1.517, p > .05) was insignificant. The only positive effect was found in Grade 8 
math (β = 5.586, p < .05) and it was small (d = .18).  
The effect of year was significantly positive across subjects and grades (Table 3). This may 
suggest that statewide average proficiency has improved regardless of school accountability status 
over the 2004-09 period. This could happen if high-stakes accountability policy gave system-wide 
incentives or pressure to schools in good standing as well (e.g., inducing school improvement efforts 
under the threat of potential sanctions and intervention in the future). Was this test score gain 
authentic and transferrable? Comparison of achievement gains on state assessment (high-stakes test) 
with gains on NAEP (low-stakes test) for the same cohort of students in New York State raises a 
question about the validity of gains on the state’s own assessment. Except for grade 4 math, there 
were big discrepancies in proficiency rate gains during 2003-09 period: 13% (state) vs. 2% (NAEP) 
in grade 4 ELA/reading, 24% (state) vs. -2% (NAEP) in grade 8 ELA/reading, 9% (state) vs. 7% 
(NAEP) in grade 4 math, 29% (state) vs. 2% (NAEP) in grade 8 math.11     
It is worth noting that propensity scores have significantly positive effects on PI gains across 
grades and subjects (Table 3). This suggests that the higher chance of schools being assigned to 
treatment group (i.e., identification of schools in need of improvement) may be associated with the 
higher PI gains. It seems to result partly from the tendency of regression to the mean that initially 
lower-performing schools (and thus higher chance of being assigned to treatment) gain more than 
their higher-performing counterparts. However, prior-year PI status accounts for only a small part 
of the variations in PI gain and treatment assignment. An alternative (equally plausible) explanation 
is that low-performing schools responded aggressively to the threat of being identified and assigned 
to interventions by making extra efforts to improve PI. These efforts might include many high-
stakes test preparation strategies such as reallocation, coaching, etc., and indeed those well-
documented practices (whether acceptable or unacceptable) have been observed more in low-
performing schools at the higher risk of failure (Koretz & Hamilton, 2011). The underlying 
assumption is that schools want to avoid potential stigma attached to public identifications as well as 
potential threat of sanctions and interventions (e.g., staff replacement or school reconstitution). If 
this interpretation were true, it is ironic that those positive (positive in the narrow sense of test score 
gains) effects of “threats” occur in the absence of positive effects of real “interventions.” 
Results from the differential treatment analysis showed null or negative effects of 
interventions (see Table 4). After controlling for the propensity of treatment assignment, schools 
receiving the school choice intervention (i.e. in need of improvement, year 1) experienced lower PI 
                                                
10 The effect size was computed by diving unstandardized regression coefficient by standard deviation of 
prior year Performance Index. 
11 Clearly, a major limitation of this study is relying on data from states’ own assessments that serves as a tool 
of both NCLB intervention and evaluation at the same time. Since NAEP test results are not available at the 
school level, we are unable to examine whether this seemingly statewide phenomenon of test score inflation 
under high-stakes accountability pressure occurred to the same or different extent between the treatment and 
comparison schools. 
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gains relative to schools in good standing in Grade 4 ELA (β = -3.417, p < .01). The mean PI gains 
for school choice intervention schools were not significantly different in Grade 4 math (β = -4.803, 
p > .05), Grade 8 ELA (β = .562, p > .05), and Grade 8 math (β = -.464, p > .05). Similarly, schools 
receiving SES intervention (i.e. in need of improvement, year 2) experienced significantly lower PI 
gains relative to schools in good standing in Grade 4 ELA (β = -10.042, p < .01). There were also 
insignificant gaps between schools receiving SES intervention and schools in good standing in 
Grade 4 math (β = -.275, p > .05), Grade 8 ELA (β = -3.634, p > .05) and Grade 8 math (β = -
1.518, p > .05). The same pattern was found for schools receiving corrective action intervention in 
Grade 4 ELA (β = -8.934, p > .05), Grade 8 ELA (β = -2.599, p > .05). There was an insignificant 
positive effect of corrective action on Grade 8 math (β = 6.175, p > .05). Schools planning for 
restructuring experienced lower PI gains in Grade 8 math (β = -1.285, p < .05) and in Grade 8 ELA 
(β = .162, p > .05). Result of grade 4 ELA in planning for restructuring showed insignificant gap (β 
= -.071, p > .05). Results from Grade 4 math was not available due to the lack of schools available 
for full matching in this small accountability treatment group. Finally, after controlling for the 
propensity of treatment assignment, schools that were under restructuring experienced lower gains 
in Grade 8 ELA (β = -29.484, p < .001). There was no significant restructuring effect in Grade 4 
ELA (β = -.9.947, p > .05) and in Grade 8 math (β =-2.629, p > .05).   
Interaction between Treatment and Contextual Moderators 
Despite the average negative or null effects of interventions, there are indications of 
treatment effect heterogeneity among subgroups, which were captured by interaction terms in Table 
3. First, there was a positive interaction between intervention and year of implementation in Grade 4 
ELA (β = 2.878, p < .01), Grade 4 math (β = 9.252, p < .001) and Grade 8 math (β = 5.524, p < 
.001). This general pattern (with the exception of Grade 8 ELA) suggests that schools that were 
subject to interventions in later years produced better achievement gains. Although it is uncertain 
whether this pattern is due to improvement in implementation fidelity and/or intervention design 
over time, it indicates that the intervention effect could become more positive in the longer term 
under NCLB.      
Secondly, there were also some tendency of negative interactions between intervention and 
propensity (i.e., chance of treatment group assignment): Grade 4 ELA (β = -.058, p > .05), Grade 8 
ELA (β = -.133, p > .05), Grade 4 math (β = -.359, p > .05) and Grade 8 math (β = -1.850, p < .01). 
This suggests that schools in the treatment group, ones that had relatively better pre-treatment 
conditions and thus were less likely to be assigned to treatment, produced more PI gains. Figure 3 
illustrate this pattern with the example of Grade 8 ELA. Within the common area of support where 
matching was made possible with data available for both groups, the treatment group shows higher 
PI gain than the control group at the lower propensity score range (around the logit values of -4 to -
2 on X-axis), but conversely lower gain at the higher propensity range (around the logit values of 1 
to 3 on X-axis). This variation in the treatment effect might have occurred for two reasons. It is 
likely that those treatment group schools with relatively lower propensity score were already 
performing closer to AYP targets (higher PI status prior to the intervention) and thus better able to 
meet targets regardless of intervention itself. The other possibility is that those schools with lower 
propensity had more favorable educational conditions and capacity (such as smaller class sizes and 
fewer disadvantaged students) to implement the intervention. 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of PI gain vs. propensity score by school accountability status in Grade 8 ELA: 
Interaction between treatment and propensity of treatment assignment  
 
To examine this issue further, we classified treatment schools into three categories and 
examined their schooling conditions (see Methods). The results from this analysis are summarized in 
Tables 5 and 6, and are displayed graphically in Figures 4 and 5; all values of the covariates were 
standardized (mean of zero and standard deviation of one). For this analysis, schools that received 
the same treatment yet produced different outcomes were compared against each other. From these 
results, schools in the Fail group demonstrated lower PI gains than schools in the Watch and Exit 
groups. Similarly, schools in the Watch group tended to demonstrate lower PI Gains relative to 
schools in the Exit group in Grade 4 ELA and math outcomes, however schools in the Watch group 
for Grade 8 ELA and math demonstrated higher PI Gains relative to more successful schools in the 
Exit group. Larger differences were found among these three groups in their prior year PI (i.e., 
performance status in the year right before an intervention).  The Exit group performed relatively 
much better than the other groups even before the intervention. For the sake of space and because 
the patterns were similar across prior and present years, only the results from prior year covariates 
are displayed.  
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Table 5 
Mean Score on Standardized Covariates among Treatment Subgroups: Results from Grade 4 ELA and Math for 
Prior Year 
 ELA Math 
  Exit  Watch  Fail  Exit  Watch  Fail  
PIGain 0.346 0.306 -0.384 *** .331  .464 -0.308 
PI -0.918 -1.472*** -1.747 *** -1.272 -1.743* -2.20*** 
%IEP 0.656 0.727 0.836 0.158 .668* .891*** 
%ELL 1.036 1.352 1.051 1.264 1.235 0.342 
Expenditure 0.529 0.589 0.456 0.285 0.264 0.149** 
%Free lunch 1.097 1.405 ** 1.384 ** 0.576 0.902 0.728 
School size 0.539 0.93 * 0.974 * ..897 1.08 1.07 
Pupil-teacher ratio -0.499 -0.279 -0.304 -0.262 -0.274 -0.337 
Magnet 0.021 0.123 0.438 0.249 0.118 0.433 
Urban 1.042 1.089 1.056 1.239 1.282 1.282 
Rural -0.481 -0.524 -0.476 -0.566 -0.566 -0.566 
%White -1.194 -1.257 -1.206 -1.346 -1.276 -1.095** 
%Black 0.708 0.724 0.768 0.887 0.949 0.931 
%Hispanic 1.269 1.395 1.266 1.366 1.210 0.943 
%Asian -0.111 -0.191 -0.211 -0.193 -0.239 -0.308 
Note. Asterisks indicate the statistical significance of differences for exit group in comparison to 
watch group and fail group, respectively. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Overall, results from the paired comparisons demonstrated that schools that performed 
better with an intervention (i.e. Exit schools) had greater access to resources and less exposure to 
variables associated with academic risk relative to schools in the Watch and Fail groups. For 
example, in Grade 4 ELA, schools in the Exit group tended to have lower pupil-teacher ratio (M = -
0.499 for Exit group, M = -0.279 for Watch group, and M = -.304 for Fail group), lower percentages 
of Black students (M =.708 for Exit group, M = 0.724 for Watch group, and M = 0.768 for Fail 
group), and lower percentages of students eligible for free lunch (M = 1.097 for the Exit group, M = 
1.405 for the Watch group, and M = 1.384 for the Fail group) relative to schools in the Watch group 
and schools in the Fail group. Schools in the Exit group were also less associated with urban 
location (M = 1.042 for Exit group, M = 1.089 for Watch group, and M = 1.056 for Fail group) and 
were less likely to be a magnet school (M = 0.021 for Exit group, M = 0.123 for Watch group, and 
M = 0.438 for Fail group), compared to schools in the Watch and Fail groups. Again, these are 
examples of patterns from Grade 4 ELA, however these types of patterns are seen across grades and 
subjects. The above results suggest that both prior year PI status and preexisting school conditions 
for the Exit group may have contributed to its chance of success in the year when their intervention 
was implemented.12    
                                                
12 The prior year achievement status and school condition variables are highly correlated with each other so 
that their relative effects cannot be disentangled. 
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Table 6 
Mean Score on Standardized Covariates among Treatment Subgroups: Results from Grade 8 ELA and Math for 
Prior Year 
 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  Asterisks indicate the statistical significance of differences 
for exit group in comparison to watch group and fail group respectively.
ELA Math   
Exit  Watch  Fail  Exit  Watch  Fail  
PIGain -0.07 0.137 -0.22 .521 .313 -0.387*** 
PI -0.456 -1.163*** -1.289*** -.736 -1.355*** -1.693*** 
%IEP 0.535 0.494 0.418 .661 .522 .171*** 
%ELL 0.429 0.429*** 0.8* 1.153 1.003 1.005 
Expenditure 0.017 0.416** 0.314* 0.621 0.450* 0.081*** 
%Free lunch 0.529 1.1** 1.054* 1.006 1.186 0.658 
School size 0.102 0.575** 0.426* .601 .484 .664 
Pupil-teacher ratio -0.132 0.11 0.147* .078 .142 .209 
Magnet -0.09 0.237 0.5* 0.152 0.243 0.265 
Urban 0.314 1.085*** 1.024*** 1.08 1.129 1.124 
Rural -0.256 -0.618*** -0.573*** -0.634 -0.686 -0.724 
%White -0.496 -1.164** -1.084** -1.213 -1.132 -1.31*** 
%Black 0.477 0.808 0.936** 0.730 1.078** 1.078** 
%Hispanic 0.427 1.025** 0.818* 1.207 1.093 1.100 
%Asian -0.137 0.316* 0.114 .286 .100 .023* 
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Figure 4. Covariate profiles of three accountability groups in Grade 4 and Grade 8 ELA.  
The Y-axis represents standardized mean values of student demographics and schooling 
conditions, located in the legend. 
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Findings from Case Study 
While there can be many possible reasons for the variability of observed effects for NCLB 
interventions, we pay attention to potential flaws in both theory of action and implementation 
practice. The results of the above quantitative analysis call for qualitative analysis that addresses why 
and how “one size fits all” approach to mandated interventions did not work at the school level. To 
help illustrate problems with school intervention processes and to enrich understanding of the 
results of statistical analysis, we examined the case of two selected Title I schools in a disadvantaged 
low-performing urban school district setting under restructuring stage (referred to as X and Y in this 
article). This case study is based on our analysis of the New York State Department of Education’s 
(NYSED) building level monitoring review reports that incorporate information from a review of 
documents submitted by schools as well as a site visit to the school with interviews and 
observations.  
The review utilized a checklist form with 64 indicators (48 indicators in the area of 
instructional support; 15 indicators in the area of accountability; 1 indicator in the area of fiduciary 
responsibility). At the time of the NYSED review (Feb. 2009), elementary school X (with grades P-
6) was under restructuring year 1 status for ELA, and the review shows that the school met state 
requirements for 43 indicators among 62 (except for 2 inapplicable indicators); the estimated rate of 
fidelity (as measured by the percentage of indicators that met requirements) was 69%. At the same 
time, middle-high school Y (with grades 7-12) was under restructuring year 4 for ELA and year 2 for 
math, and the review shows that the school met state requirements for 43 indicators among 64 and 
the rate of fidelity (the percentage of indicators that met requirements based on our calculation) was 
67%. Although we do not know how typical or unique these implementation fidelity rates are across 
the state, the reviews reveal that not all schools were fully compliant.  
 For school X, the monitoring report identifies several areas of implementation incompliance. 
One comment related to problems referred to School X’s academic intervention services: 
The School Academic Intervention Services (AIS) Plan is not being implemented 
appropriately for students who are at risk of not meeting State Standards academic 
performance. Classroom teachers…reported that they frequently have difficulty 
finding additional time during the school day to provide AIS to all identified 
students. 
Other problem-related comments on School X dealt with parental involvement. One 
comment was that “reviewers did not find evidence that parents are involved in an 
organized, on-going and timely way in the planning, review and implementation of the 
Title I program.” This was reiterated in another comment from the report: 
The school has not developed a written Title I Parent Involvement Policy. They use 
the District developed Title I Parent Involvement Policy but that policy does not 
include all required components. 
For School Y, the monitoring report identifies several areas of implementation incompliance.  The 
report states that “(t)he school does not aggregate the data for subgroups.” Furthermore, the report 
stated that there was an “inconsistent use of research-based strategies that targeted varied needs of 
students” and recommended that the school be “consistent with District plans, move to an RTI 
(Response to Intervention) model and ensure that services are varied to meet student needs.”  The 
report also stated that for School Y, “(t)here are no professional development activities within 
school to teach staff strategies to build partnerships between parents and the school. The District 
offers multiple opportunities but participation appears to be voluntary.” 
  These types of reviews identify the status of school compliance in terms of whether or not 
the school met requirements. For schools that did not meet the requirements, there are required 
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corrective actions or recommendations provided in the report. However, a key limitation of these 
types of reviews are the narrow focus on compliance with federal or state policy mandates without 
addressing school- and classroom-level instructional changes. In an interview with the director of 
Title I school and community services office, it was acknowledged that the site review does not 
involve experts with subject matter knowledge and thus classroom observations/reviews are 
superficial without substantial details. The interview also suggested that despite the seemingly high 
fidelity of implementation based on the checklist, many schools remain low-performing and the 
review does not address this deficiency. In fact, the state department discontinued building-level 
review due to the lack of staff and capacity; as conveyed in the interview, the way that this review is 
conducted does not really capture instructional dynamics. The structure of the review focuses on 
procedural compliance for provision of required services on the side of school administration/staff 
rather than focused on the effective delivery or receipt of services from the perspective of parents or 
students. The report does not have any information or evidence on how effective or ineffective 
current practices are, nor did it convey expected consequences of full or partial implementation of 
all required actions.  
Although we don’t have access to all other individual Title I schools’ implementation fidelity 
information, the statewide report on policy implementation suggests that program delivery and 
service receipt were not highly consistent or effective (U.S. Department of education, 2006a; 2006b, 
2007; 2008; 2009; 2010). The use of services under NCLB has been extremely low for school 
transfer and modest for SES (see Appendix C). For school transfer, application rates ranged from 
2.2% (in 2005) to 3.3% (in 2009), and the percent of students who actually transferred to another 
school ranged from only 0.2 % (in 2005) to 1.3% (in 2009). For SES, both application and usage 
rates were around 32 % to 37%. For schools under correction actions, the most frequent choices 
were implementation of a new research-based curriculum or instructional program (49% in 2007) 
and extension of the school year or school day (20% in 2008). For schools under restructuring 
(implementation year 2), relatively few of them used the option of replacing school staff (21% in 
2007 and 13% in 2008) and none went through extreme actions including charter school conversion, 
outsourcing to private management, and state take over (see Appendix C).  
Discussion 
The findings of this study on school intervention effects in New York State may add further 
insight (albeit perplexing) to our existing knowledge base on the efficacy of NCLB. First of all, the 
average “intent to treat” (ITT) effects of interventions were null or negative once those treatment 
schools have been matched to their counterparts without interventions. The treatment effects were 
sometimes worse for sequentially higher levels of interventions. The results do not support that 
“one size fits all” approach under NCLB school accountability system nor do findings support the 
underlying theory of action that the more chronically low-performing schools going through 
prescribed regimen of progressively intensive interventions, the greater academic improvement for 
turnaround and exit.  
However, the average treatment effects obscure substantial variations in intervention effects 
in relation to the context of schools and the timing of implementation. Some positive effects were 
observed among low-performing schools with relatively more favorable conditions (and thus lower 
propensity of assignment to treatment) as well as among schools that were identified relatively later 
for interventions (and thus higher chance of policy adaptation and school organizational learning). It 
remains to be examined further what specific context and time factors influenced the effects of 
intervention and how.  
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Our findings underscore the importance of considering school context and background 
when developing a theory of action and evaluating the effect of accountability treatment on 
students’ achievement gains. When designing or evaluating treatments, overlooking aspects of a 
school’s social and racial composition and failing to account for district capacity and other 
characteristics may become fatal. In our study, ineffective schools in intervention (i.e. the fail group) 
had inferior environmental conditions (e.g., bigger school size, larger pupil-teacher ratio, or higher 
percentages of students eligible for free lunch) relative to effective schools in intervention (i.e. the 
exit group). School intervention plans should therefore be applied with consideration of each 
school’s specific environmental context and specific school needs, rather than using a universal 
intervention plan to suit the needs of all schools. Schools with high percentage of at-risk students 
would need additional supports such as extra funding, technical assistance, or human resources from 
state education agencies.   
Lastly, findings from the supplementary content analysis and interview provide insight into 
reasons why intervention may not be as effective as it could be. Notably, the way in which 
compliance information was being captured by NYSED seemingly provided very little useful 
information or guidance on schools’ changes in instruction and its shifts in educational culture. The 
lack of technical and human resource capacity is a major barrier for state education agency to play a 
bigger role in those aspects. Moving forward, the gap in these crucial areas need to be addressed in 
monitoring reports with information for specific subject areas and student subgroups.  For more 
contextually rich understanding of problems and data-driven accountability decision-making, 
quantitative information based on the analysis of state test results needs to be supplemented by 
information from qualitative analysis of instructional practices and needs. The well-known 
phenomenon of large gains in student proficiency based on high-stakes state test (vis-à-vis little or 
no gains based on low-stakes NAEP test) repeats in New York state data, and it may renew old 
debates. One may argue that it reinforces the theory of action for high-stakes testing in that the 
possible sanctions for schools that are at risk of failing to meet the standard motivates actions. 
Others may dismiss the results in that the standard itself as measured by such high-stakes tests is not 
a valid indicator of meaningful learning. Both sides of the debate have flaws and do not inform 
policy decisions. The theory of action for NCLB combines threats with mandated series of 
interventions that cost lots of taxpayer money, and thus key litmus test should focus on the efficacy 
of interventions. While we shared concerns about the test score inflations for high-stakes testing, we 
assumed that those effects would equally apply to schools under similar conditions and risk of 
failure (matched treatment and comparison groups) and thus do not prohibit comparing relative 
school performance against the state’s own standards. We found that interventions per se did not 
produce systematically larger gains for schools in the treatment group when they were matched to 
the comparison group. This suggests that it may be threats rather than mandated interventions that 
induced those across-the-board gains observed on the state test only.  
NCLB is at a crossroads. The law is up for reauthorization, while its test-driven school 
accountability policy has been under intense controversy with highly mixed findings on the 
implementation and efficacy of school interventions under NCLB. Top-down prescription of school 
interventions under NCLB may not be an exception to the fate of many previous education 
interventions that often failed to show scalable and sustainable effects on student achievement. 
When a policy fails to have the intended effect, it is often due to one of two types of failure: theory 
failure, or program failure. As the findings of our study imply, school policy interventions under 
NCLB might have had limited and heterogeneous impact on student outcomes because of problems 
with both theory of action and program.  
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As with many other states, New York State recently obtained NCLB waivers thorough its 
reform proposal that aligns with federal “Race to the Top Program” (RTTP), including raising the 
rigor of performance standards, adopting teacher evaluation based on student achievement, and 
implementing differentiated school interventions (NYSED, 2012). This move may indicate an 
acknowledgement that the past policy approach under NCLB did not work well. In light of our 
finding on the heterogeneity of treatment effects, it is more meaningful to allow for developing 
differentiated improvement plans that consider each school’s unique context. It is also crucial to set 
more realistic targets based on growth trends and with sufficient time for policy adaptation and 
capacity building.  The new intervention approach under waivers appears to follow these desired 
directions and thus may have the potential to be more flexible and cohesive than the old approach. 
However, results will be sadly predictable, if any state’s initiatives under waivers remain to operate 
by the old theory of action for school turnaround and retain the same old interventions in new 
policy designs that under NCLB have shown to play a dubious role.13  
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Appendix A 
Table A1 
Variables description 
Variable Name Description 
Dependent Variables  
PI Gain Gain of Performance Index of ELA and Math assessment 
Independent Variables 
Overall Effect models  
Intervention Dummy variable indicating NCLB intervention under school 
accountability (In good standing (control group)=0, the other 
accountability status (intervention treatment group)=1) 
Year Academic year (2005~2009) 
Intervention X Year Interaction effect of intervention and year 
Differentiated Effects models 
Intervention 1  Dummy variable indicating intervention of “Needing improvement year 1” 
under NCLB accountability (e.g., school choice) 
Intervention 2 
 
Dummy variable indicating intervention of “Needing improvement year 2” 
under NCLB accountability (e.g., supplemental educational service) 
Intervention 3 
 
Dummy variable indicating intervention of “Corrective action” under 
NCLB accountability  
Intervention 4 
 
Dummy variable indicating intervention of “Planning for restructuring” 
under NCLB accountability  
Intervention 5 
 
Dummy variable indicating intervention of “Restructuring” under NCLB 
accountability (e.g., Replacing principal, Reopen to charter school) 
Year Academic year (2005~2009) 
Covariates  
Accountability  School Accountability status under NCLB prior year (Interventions under 
NCLB/accountability) 
%Free lunch Percentage of students who are eligible in free lunch program in school 
%White students Percentage of White students in school 
%Black students Percentage of Black students in school 
%Hispanic students Percentage of Hispanic students in school 
%Asian students Percentage of Asian students in school 
School size Total number of students in school 
Pupil-teacher ratio Pupil teacher ratio in school 
Magnet school A dummy variable indicating magnet school  
Urban A dummy variable indicating school location as urban  
Rural A dummy variable indicating school location as rural  
% ELL Percentage of ELL students in district 
%IEP Percentage of students in special education in district 
Expenditure per 
pupil 
Instructional expenditure per pupil in district 
PI Performance Index prior year 
PIGain Gain of performance index prior year 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Reading 
Mean (SD) 
Math 
Mean (SD) 
Variables 4th 8th 4th 8th 
Dependent Variable     
PIGain 1.9 (14.73) 5.82 (14.05) .14 (14.44) 7.93 (16.94) 
Covariates: Prior Year     
Accountability .09 (.29) .27 (.44) .03 (.18) .18 (.39) 
%Free lunch .33 (.295) .30 (.27) .33 (.30) .30 (.27) 
%White students .58 (.381) .64 (.378) .58 (.38) .64 (.38) 
%Black students .18 (.255) .16 (.236) .18 (.25) .16 (.24) 
%Hispanic students .18 (.227) .15 (.218) .17 (.23) .15 (.22) 
%Asian students .06 (.115) .05 (.089) .06 (.12) .05 (.09) 
School size 525.54 
(238.252) 
674.13 
(355.662) 
527.30 
(237.54) 
673.86 
(355.80) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 13.55 (2.286) 12.95 (2.59) 13.54 (2.26) 12.80 (4.6) 
Magnet school .05 (.21) 0.03 (.17) .0491 (.22) .03 (.17) 
Urban .38 (.49) 0.32 (.47) .38 (.49) .32 (.47) 
Rural .24 (.43) 0.38 (.48) .24 (.43) .38 (.48) 
% ELL .06 (.074) .05 (.072) .06 (.07) .05 (.07) 
% IEP .14 (.037) .14 (.038) .14 (.04) .14 (.05) 
Expenditure per pupil 10940.72 
(2504.73) 
10845.13 
(2700.457) 
10942.89 
(2504.74) 
10689.15 
(2760.77) 
PI 163.38 (23.48) 148.38 
(24.87) 
177.64 
(19.73) 
151.60 
(31.25) 
PIGain 1.65 (14.65) 2.4 (12.94) .437 (14.54) 3.68 (17.10) 
Covariates: Present 
Year 
    
%Free lunch .38 (.299) .34 (.281) .38 (.30) .30 (.27) 
%White students .57 (.379) .64 (.378) .57 (.38) .64 (.38) 
%Black students .18 (.253) .15 (.234) .17 (.25) .15 (.23) 
%Hispanic students .18 (.228) .15 (.219) .18 (.23) .15 (.22) 
%Asian students .06 (.117) .05 (.092) .06 (.12) .05 (.09) 
School size 520.05 
(235.779) 
656.53  
(348.92) 
521.57 
(234.92) 
 656.16 
(349.03) 
Pupil teacher ratio 13.51 (5.574) 12.80 (4.61) 13.49 (5.59) 12.80 (4.6) 
 Note: Mean values are listed with standard deviations underneath 
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Appendix C  
 
Description of School Identification Rules and Intervention Practices  
 
1. School Identification and Exit Rules 
• To be identified for improvement status, a school must fail to make adequate yearly 
progress (AYP) for two consecutive years in the same grade and subject.  
• If a previously identified school fails to make AYP in the grade and subject in which it 
was identified, it moves to the next highest status on the continuum.  
• If an identified school makes AYP, it remains in the same status on the continuum.  
• To be removed from improvement status in a subject and grade, the school must make 
AYP in that subject and grade for two consecutive years. The school may remain or be 
placed in improvement status in another subject and/or grade for which it has not made 
AYP.  
• (Source: School and District Accountability Reports Implementing No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB), March 2004, New York State Department of Education website) 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/repcrdfall2003/accountability/html/understanding-
accountability-reports_frame.htm, slide 31p.) 
• For schools to make AYP, they must1. meet the 95 percent participation requirement, 
and 2. either meet its Effective AMO or make safe harbor. 
 
Despite these seemingly common rules for identification, there are exceptions and variations that 
further complicate the results. New York State allows for adjustment of performance targets based 
on group size and applies “confidence interval” to the determination of effective AMO. The 
accountability rule says “Recognizing that the annual performance data for relatively small groups of 
students are not statistically reliable, the State has established Effective AMOs based on the number 
of students in a measured group.  The Effective AMO is the lowest PI that an accountability group 
of a given size can achieve in a subject for the group’s PI not to be considered significantly different 
from the AMO.” The range of acceptable performance index varies by school size in the same 
subject and grade. Therefore, depending on accountability subgroup size even within the same 
school, different AMOs are applied (e.g, Grade 4 ELA AMO =116 for White group with N= 40 vs. 
AMO = 121 for Black group with N = 100). The majority of school districts were not required to 
make AYP for the students with disabilities accountability subgroup because they did not have a 
minimum enrollment of 30 students with disabilities. 
These complicated rules that involve multiple assignment variables with group size-dependent 
cutscores make it impractical to apply regression discontinuity design due to concerns about the loss 
of power and generalizability. Therefore, we chose to employ propensity score matching strategy as 
an alternative. It matches two groups (schools in good standing vs. schools in need of improvement) 
based on the broader range of covariates that may influence both treatment assignment and 
performance outcomes. They include demographic compositions and school size as well as prior 
year performance and accountability status. Other option is to use fixed effects regression that 
capitalizes on temporal variations of intervention status within the same schools only.    
Specifically, the first analysis addressed the overall treatment effect while the second addressed 
differential treatment effects.  
Analysis of Overall Treatment Effect. In order to investigate the overall treatment effect, school 
accountability status was dichotomized such that 0 = in good standing, and 1 = receiving accountability 
treatment. Then, this dichotomous variable was regressed on all of the covariates to produce a 
probability, or propensity score. Since time-varying covariates affect the propensity score of 
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intervention variously by time period, covariates from prior and present years were used to create 
propensity scores. This propensity score was used in the weighting and estimation of overall effects. 
The binary treatment analysis used the predicted probability of being assigned into any one of the 
intervention condition; schools in good standing were coded as 0 and schools in any phase of 
intervention were coded as 1. This analysis allowed us to evaluate the effectiveness of overall 
treatment after controlling for all covariates, year, and interactions between treatment and year.  
Analysis of Differential Treatment Effect. The second analysis included an evaluation of a 
differential treatment effects model. In this analysis, a multinomial logistic regression model was 
used to predict six accountability intervention conditions that may be considered progressively more 
aggressive. With schools in good standing as the reference group (or 0), the other treatment 
conditions were coded as follows: Intervention Year One = 1, Intervention Year Two = 2, In Corrective 
Action = 3, Planning for Restructuring = 4, Restructuring = 5. Schools that identified (in the primary data 
sources) as being In Restructuring Year One, In Restructuring Year Two, In Restructuring Year Three or In 
Restructuring Year Four or above were collapsed into a single category for this study and analysis. All of 
the schools that were in good standing or in different stage of interventions were assigned weights 
according to the estimated conditional probability of their group assignment.   
 
2. School Intervention Practices 
The following tables summarize the number of students who were eligible and received Public 
School Choice and Supplemental Educational Services in Title I schools identified for improvement, 
corrective action or restructuring in New York State. 
 
Public School Choice   
 
  
 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
-Number of students who were 
eligible for services 
228,450 429,683 315,326 314,436 298,999 
-Number of students who applied 
for services 
4,996 N/A 11,469 9,884 10,010 
-Number of students who received 
services 
551 4,102 3,692 4,090 3,900 
Supplemental Educational Services   
 
  
 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
-Number of students who were 
eligible for services 
268,768 272,164 274,114 251,240 289,647 
-Number of students who applied 
for services 
N/A 88,934 81,073 92,378 98,011 
-Number of students who received 
services 
105,035 87,814 64,906 87,579 92,651 
 
The following tables summarize the frequency of specific intervention strategies adopted by Title I 
schools under Corrective action and Restructuring year 2 in New York State. 
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Corrective Action # of Title I Schools in 
Corrective Action  
 
 2006-07 2007-08 
-Required implementation of a new research-
based curriculum or instructional program 
60 32 
 
-Extension of the school year or school day 28 72 
-Replacement of staff members relevant to the 
school's low performance 
3 4 
-Significant decrease in management authority at 
the school level 
8 18 
-Replacement of the principal 12 5 
-Restructuring the internal organization of the 
school 
11 23 
-Appointment of an outside expert to advise the 
school 
2 8 
 
Restructuring Action # of Title I Schools in 
Restructuring Year 2  
 
 2006-07 2007-08 
-Replacement of all or most of the school staff 
(which may include the principal) 
10 6 
-Reopening the school as a public charter school 0 0 
-Entering into a contract with a private entity to 
operate the school 
0 0 
-Take over the school by the State 0 0 
-Other major restructuring of the school 
governance 
37 40** 
Note: 
** NYC Schools Only: Of the 24 NYC schools in Restructuring Year 2 during the 2007-2008 school 
year, 22 implemented activities that supported other major restructuring of the school governance. 
The specific "other major restructuring of school governance" actions that were implemented 
include: 
A. School Organization  
Creation of "houses" or "academies" Smaller Learning Communities Change in grade configurations 
Change in student programming (block scheduling, self-contained, departmentalized, etc)  
B. Zoning 
Change in feeder patterns, Change in zoning 
C. Targeted Interventions for specific identified subgroups 
Multi-faceted and drastic changes in the curriculum and/or delivery of the educational program for 
the specific subgroup(s) of students that caused the school to be designated as Restructuring Year 2 
D. Professional Development 
To support the educational program of the restructured school (professional development before 
the start of the implementation year; differentiation of professional development appropriate to the 
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assignment of needs of staff due to the new organizational structure of new grade configurations, 
etc; professional development for supervisory/administrative staff due to the new structure) 
E. Changes in Resource Allocations 
F. School Support Organization 
 
Sources:  
U.S. Department of education (2006b). Consolidated State Performance Report: Part I and II, for 
reporting on School Year 2005-2006 New York State, Washington DC:  U.S. Department of 
education, http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/consolidated/sy05-06/ny.pdf  
U.S. Department of education (2007). Consolidated State Performance Report: Part I and II, for 
reporting on School Year 2006-2007 New York State, Washington DC:  U.S. Department of 
education 2006-07: http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/consolidated/sy06-
07part1/ny.pdf   
U.S. Department of education (2008). Consolidated State Performance Report: Part I and II, for 
reporting on School Year 2007-2008 New York State, Washington DC:  U.S. Department of 
education http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/consolidated/sy07-08part1/ny.pdf  
U.S. Department of education (2009). Consolidated State Performance Report: Part I and II, for 
reporting on School Year 2008-2009 New York State, Washington DC:  U.S. Department of 
education http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/consolidated/sy08-09part1/ny.pdf  
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